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Shaping Trade Through Policy: Strategic Trade Policies and Their Outcomes
Globalization and International Management · Chapter 7: Trade Policy, Protectionism, and Competitive AdvantageSection 7.6 · lesson 55 of 7311 min · free to watch
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In this lesson
How subsidies can tip a two-firm contest, and what can go wrong.
- Read a simple payoff table and find its stable outcomes
- Explain how a government subsidy can change a rival firm's decision
- Calculate a nation's net payoff with and without subsidies
- Evaluate the risks of retaliation, picking the wrong winner and taxpayer cost
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Transcript
Everything said in the video, section by section (1,534 words). Read along, or search it.
Opening Analogy
Two Lemonade Stands, One Corner
Two lemonade stands face a street corner, with room for only one. If both set up, both lose money. If one sets up first, the other stays home.
Now suppose a parent offers one child a free table, and a big sign. But only if the child sets up. The other child, seeing this, may decide not to try. That small trick is the heart of strategic trade policy. This lesson shows it with a payoff table. Then it asks the hard question: what could go wrong?
By the end, you will be able to read a simple payoff table. You will see how a subsidy can change a rival's decision, in a contest between two firms. And you will weigh the risks: retaliation, picking the wrong winner, and the cost to taxpayers.
Game Theory Basics
Games, Payoff Tables and Subsidies
Start with a contest between two firms. Recall new trade theory, from lesson 7.5. In industries with large scale effects, only one or two firms can earn a profit. So every firm has to think about what its rival will do.
Economists have a word for this. A situation in which each player's best choice depends on what the other does, is called a game.
To study a game, they draw a payoff table. It is a table that lists each player's reward, for each pair of choices. Rows for one player, columns for the other, and a reward in every cell.
Now the key idea. Strategic trade policy means a government acts to change the outcome of such a contest, in favor of its own firm. One common tool is a subsidy, which is a payment to a firm.
The idea was developed in the early 1980s, by the economists James Brander and Barbara Spencer, among others. It built directly on the scale ideas of new trade theory.
Reading the Table
Enter or Stay Out for a Battery Bike
Here is the lesson's example. Take a new kind of battery bike, that the world will buy from only one profitable maker. There are two firms, both composites made up for teaching: a Valdoran firm A, and an Ostrian firm B. Each chooses one of two moves: enter the market, or stay out.
The payoffs are in millions of dollars of profit. And they are made up, for teaching. If both enter, each loses 5. If only one enters, it earns 100, and the other earns nothing. If neither enters, both get nothing.
How do you read a payoff table? Each cell shows two numbers: A's payoff first, then B's. Pick a column, which is B's choice, and ask what A would do. Then pick a row, which is A's choice, and ask what B would do.
A cell where neither player wants to change, is a stable outcome. Now try it, on this game. Suppose B enters. Then A would rather stay out, and earn nothing, than enter and lose 5. Suppose B stays out. Then A would rather enter, and earn 100.
Two Stable Outcomes
Whoever Commits First Gets the Market
So A's best move depends on B's. And the same is true for B. That gives two stable outcomes: A in and B out, or B in and A out. Either one could happen.
What decides it? Whoever commits first tends to get the market. A first mover can claim it, and the other firm, seeing that, stays home. Just like the lemonade stands. Notice what is missing here. Nothing in the table says which firm should win. Both are equally able. The winner is simply the one that moves first, and makes its move believable. That opening is exactly what a government may try to use.
Adding a Subsidy
A Promise of Twenty-Five Million Dollars
Next: how a subsidy changes the game. Now, the government of Valdora promises firm A $25 million, if it enters. This raises every payoff in which A enters, by 25.
Look at the two cells that change. If both enter, A now earns 20, while B still loses 5. If A enters and B stays out, A now earns 125, and B earns nothing.
Here is what changed. A's best choice no longer depends on B. Entering earns 20, or 125. Staying out earns nothing. So A enters, whatever B does.
B can see this too. It compares its two options, against an entering A. If B enters, it loses 5. If B stays out, it earns nothing. So B stays out.
A check of every cell confirms it. With the subsidy, there is only one stable outcome: A enters, and B stays out. The government's promise makes entering the best move for A, whatever B does. And that pushes B out.
National Payoff
The Gain Comes From the Rival's Choice
Now count what Valdora gets. Its firm, A, earns 125. Of that, 25 came from taxpayers. So the nation keeps 125, minus 25, which is $100 million dollars.
Without the subsidy, Valdora might also have reached 100. But only if A moved first. The subsidy makes that outcome more certain.
So what does it mean? The subsidy pays off by changing the rival's decision, not by the gift itself. That is the whole point. If B would have stayed out anyway, the $25 million would only move money, from taxpayers to the firm's owners. There would be no gain for the country.
What Can Go Wrong
Retaliation and Picking the Wrong Winner
Now, what can go wrong? Three things, at least. Start with retaliation. Ostria's government can make the same offer, to firm B.
Then both firms enter. Each firm's payoff is 20. And each government has paid 25. So each nation nets 20, minus 25: a loss of 5 million dollars.
Each subsidy cancels the other. The advantage Valdora hoped to buy is gone. The firms and their owners are better off. Meanwhile, taxpayers fund the contest.
The second risk is picking the wrong winner. The table assumes the government knows the payoffs. In real life, it does not. It does not know how much firms will earn after costs. It does not know who will really enter. And it does not know how fast costs will fall.
So a government may back a firm that fails. Or an industry that never becomes a good bet. Critics also warn that subsidy decisions can be bent by lobbying, a topic from lesson 7.4. Then the money may go to the best-connected firm, rather than the best prospect.
Defenders and Referees
The Same Game Through Taxpayers' Eyes
There are other costs, too. Taxes are needed to fund the payment. And buyers lose benefits, if prices fall less than they might.
What do defenders say? They answer that in some industries, the scale effects are real. That other governments already subsidize. And that doing nothing is also a choice, with costs.
Reasonable people differ, and the evidence in individual cases is mixed. There is also a referee. In general terms, WTO rules limit some kinds of subsidies. They also allow other members to respond, to those that harm them. Lesson 6.6 covers those rules.
Step back, and see the same game through taxpayers' eyes. If only Valdora pays, A earns 125, pays back 25, and Valdora nets 100. The rival country gets nothing.
With no subsidy at all, the result depends on who moves first. Valdora gets 100, or nothing. Or both lose 5, if both enter. And if both pay, each nation loses 5 million dollars.
Teaching Case
Rafael Questions the Battery Plant Subsidy
Same table, different decisions. The gain exists only when it changes the rival's choice. A subsidy can pay off for one country that acts alone. Yet it can cost both countries, when each acts.
Now a teaching case: Rafael and the battery plant. Rafael and Brightloom are a composite case built for teaching, and the numbers are illustrative. Valdora's ministry wants to subsidize a firm. That firm would build a large battery plant, that only one firm in the world will profitably run. Rafael is asked for his view, since Brightloom would buy from it.
He asks three questions. Does the firm's rival in Ostria really plan to enter? Does the ministry have good numbers on costs? And what would Valdora do, if Ostria offered the same subsidy?
The ministry cannot answer the second, or the third. So Rafael tells them this: a promise that can be matched changes the game less than it appears to.
Common Mistake
A Payoff Table Is Not a Forecast
A common mistake is reading the payoff table as a forecast. It is not. The numbers are made up, to show the logic. The real lesson is the structure. Who moves first? Who can copy? And what does the subsidy change?
Try it yourself. Change one number. Suppose the subsidy is $15 million, instead of $25 million. Look at A's payoff when entering, against an entering B. Does entering still pay A, in every case? Which option would the rival firm choose?
Key Takeaways
When a Subsidy Changes the Game
Key takeaways. When only one maker can profit, each firm watches the other, and whoever commits first tends to win. A government promise can make entering pay for its own firm, whatever the rival does, and so push the rival out. That gain is real only when the rival's choice changes. If the rival would have stayed out anyway, the money simply moves from taxpayers to owners. And if both governments pay, both nations lose. So read every table for its structure, never as a forecast. Next, in lesson 7.7, the oldest idea in trade theory: absolute advantage. This lesson was made by UPI Study.
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